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Crucially, the agent is intrinsically motivated, due to ‘warm glow altruism’. In addition, the
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1 Introduction
Reforming public services has been and remains very high on the policy agenda for many
developed countries. Examples of the recent debates over organisational forms and incentive
schemes in public service provision are the so-called Reinventing Government, Modernising
Government, and New Public Managementapproaches,1 and the current policy discussions
in UK, US and elsewhere.2
Some often posed questions are whethert there is scope for improvements in the perfor-
mance of government organisations? If there is, should performance-pay be introduced, or how
should public services/outputs and budget appropriations be linked, to enhance public service
delivery? What are the e¢ ciency properties of an optimally designed public organisation, or
will production take place at minimum monetary costs and equate the sponsors marginal will-
ingness to pay with the marginal cost of public output? If not, how is the productivity of the
agency related to the kind of the necessary ine¢ ciencies? Should incentives be high-powered,
or should the monetary rewards from exerting the appropriate level of e¤ort and transmitting
truthfully any required information be high?
The approaches mentioned above are based on the presumption that people care only
about money and call for the introduction of private sector practices into the public sector,
yet production of non-marketable, or collective, goods and services, whether by public bureau-
cracies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that are given the task of providing public
services, or public-benet nonprot organisations, is often mission-driven. For such organi-
sations,3 agents may be inuenced by attitudes, ideology, professional modes, or they may
simply care about the amount and quality produced and their input.4 For instance, doctors
and nurses take satisfaction from curing patients, academics take satisfaction in contributing
1See Osborne and Gaebler (1993) and Barzelay (2001).
2For some discussions on the current debate, see Burgess and Ratto (2003), Propper and Wilson (2003),
Grout and Young (2003) and Grout and Stevens (2003). For a recent policy document on reforming public
services see HM Treasury (2000).
3Hereafter, we will interchange the words (public) agency, agent(s) and agencys head.
4The non-pecuniary benets that public agents derive from their output can also be thought of as a kind of
intrinsic motivation. However, here these benets do not depend explicitly on the extent of monetary incentives.
For discussions of endogenous intrinsic motivation see Kreps (1997), Murdock (2002) and Benabou and Tirole
(2003).
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to the advancement of knowledge, teachers take pleasure from producing good students, and
aid-workers care about the successful provision of aid.5
In addition, especially in public and nonprot organisations responsible for the produc-
tion of non-marketable goods and services, agents can use only the resources which are made
available to them by the sponsor(s) for production. That is, agents cannot use their own wealth
for the production of the organisations output.6
Therefore, the above literature may not always be well-suited for the study of the design
of public and related organisations. Since mission-motivation and the presence of resource
constraints seem relevant in organisations that provide collective goods and services, it is im-
portant to understand their interaction with performance-pay schemes and the implications for
the optimal organisational design and provision of social services. For this reason, this paper
contributes to the current debate by studying the optimal design of an agency which specialises
in the provision of non-marketable, or collective, goods and services.7
Notice that this papers analysis is not positive in nature, though it could give some
alternative explanations for certain observations (see Section 6). We choose instead to con-
tribute to the current debate by means of a normative analysis. In particular, we study the
contract a principal should o¤er, in the presence of an administrative constraint to a motivated
agent,8 when the agents motivation is common knowledge and the agent possesses superior
information vis-a-vis the principal about his e¤ort and/or productivity. The agent is a not-for-
prot entity in that, as long as she is responsible for production, a balanced-budget increase
in production is welfare enhancing for her. In other words, the agent values the output that
she produces beyond the associated wage she earns.9 The administrative constraint requires
5See also Besley and Ghatak (2005). See Heckman et al. (1997), Burgess and Ratto (2003), Glazer (2004),
Francois (2000, 2003, and 2004) for discussions and evidence of intrinsic motivation in various nonprot organ-
isations. For a discussion of mission-motivation in government bureaucracies see Wilson (1989, p. 26). For an
alternative model of endogenously determined missions in bureaucracies, see Dewatripont et al. (1999).
6See also Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Francois (2000 and2003).
7 In the terminology of Horn (1995) we focus on administrative bureaus. For discussions of administrative
bureaus, see Horn (1995, pp. 33, 40-43, 79-82, 170-172 and 180), Niskanen (1971, p. 24), Wilson (1989, p. 33),
and Dixit (2002a).
8We use hereafter interchangeably the terms (intrinsically/mission/output) motivated agent and not-for-prot
agent.
9Thus, intrinsic motivation arises here due to warm-glow altruism. See, for instance, Andreoni
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that all monetary costs of production must be born solely by the principal. In other words,
the agent cannot use her own wealth for the provision of the non-marketable services.
In studying the optimal contract in question, we ask whether the e¢ ciency properties of
the workings of such an agency are compromised by its possessing private information about
important determinants of the provision of services? If so, how should performance measures
and budget appropriations be linked to enhance public service delivery? How are the possible
ine¢ ciencies related to the intrinsic motivation of the agent? How does the power of incentives
depend on the output-motivation of the agent, or is intrinsic motivation a substitute for mon-
etary incentives? Does output, for given productivity, increase with the mission-orientation of
the agent?
Our analysis has important implications for the optimal design of public agencies, NGOs
and, in general, nonprot organisations which are responsible for the production of collective
goods. Specically, by answering the above questions, we demonstrate how the naive appli-
cation of the private sector model to the public sector may worsen public service delivery. In
more detail, we nd that depending on the intensity of the non-pecuniary motive, the principal
will either be able to implement the complete information contract or nd it optimal to distort
the performance of both the ine¢ cient and the e¢ cient agent! Furthermore, in the latter case,
the principal may be able to ensure that no information rents are given to the agent (i.e. that
service provision takes place at minimum monetary costs) regardless of the agents productiv-
ity and even if public services are always provided. In addition, we nd that the power of
incentives is weakly decreasing with mission-motivation. In particular, incentives can be at
even if the agent produces, regardless of her productivity, and even if the full-information out-
come is not implementable. Finally, we nd that higher output-motivation, while maintaining
productivity, does not necessarily lead to an increase in public services. Though some of these
ndings may bear some similarities with certain results in the literature, as we discuss in the
next Section, the above properties of an optimally designed organisation are largely di¤erent
from many existing theoretical results.
Using these results, we are then also able to discuss, in Section 6, various issues in
reforming provision of collective goods, like increasing competition and/or user-involvement,
(1988). For example, the relevance of such altruism is shown by the Olympic Games volunteers (see
http://www.athens2004.com /en/Volunteers/ indexpage).
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the choice of an organisations mission, bureaucratic conservatism and innovation. In many
instances there, we explain how common policy proposals and common beliefs about the impli-
cations of incentives for the provision of social services may not be well-suited for organisations
with the characteristics we emphasise in our study.
To understand the intuition behind our results, notice rst that the administrative con-
straint gives rise to a limited-liability condition, which, in conjuction with the not-for-prot
motivation of the agent, makes the agents outside option inferior to any feasible employment
o¤er by the principal.10 Under full information, then, the appropriate level of e¤ort is exerted
and transfers match minimum production costs. Moreover, production is such that the princi-
pals marginal benet equals the marginal production cost, which are both independent of the
agents motivation. Here, also, incentives are at: there are no monetary rewards for good
performance.
Under asymmetric information, however, the above allocation may su¤er from agency
problems. Crucially, though, the administrative constraint limits the ability of the agent to
deliver the required level of production when he over-reports his productivity. In addition, an
increase in the not-for-prot orientation reduces the incentive to induce low production, so,
if intrinsic motivation is su¢ ciently high, the agent cannot over-report and does not want to
under-report productivity. If, however, mission-motivation is su¢ ciently low, the principal may
need to o¤er information rents to the high-productivity agent to ensure good performance.
Due to the agents intrinsic motivation, these rents depend on the performances of both the
low- and the high- productivity agents. Therefore, reducing rents requires distorting production
regardless of cost-type. Also, the availability of two instruments to reduce rents may also ensure
that the agency can operate at zero rents. Moreover, due to the intrinsic motivation, the agent
is more willing to perform well, which implies that the power of incentives can be zero even if
the full-information outcome is not implementable. Finally, an increase in output-motivation
may lead to lower production for low-productivity agencies. The reason is that motivation and
output of the low-productivity agent are substitutes in the reduction of rents.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature,
while Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses some benchmark cases, while Section
10For an adverse selection problem with limited-liability constraints and the agent being only money-motivated,
see Sappington (1983), and the treatment in La¤ont and Martimort (2002, Ch. 3.5).
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5 solves for the optimal contract. Our results and their policy implications are discussed in
Section 6. Section 7 concludes and points to directions for further research.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical apparatus used by the approaches mentioned in the Introduction is the principal-
agent paradigm, where, typically, one party, the principal, possesses all the bargaining power
and the other party, the agent, is money-motivated and has superior information about impor-
tant determinants of production such as the agents e¤ort and/or productivity. This model is
used also by many existing studies of procurement and regulation, such as the ones in Baron
and Myerson (1982), La¤ont and Tirole (1993), La¤ont and Martimort (2002) and elsewhere.11
The main message of this model is that when the outside option of the agent is not increasing
very much with the agents productivity and the agents disutility from exerting e¤ort is not
very high, optimal organisation satises the following: if truthful transmission of information
requires monetary incentives, then the low-productivity agent must be asked to produce below
the full-information level. In addition, the high-productivity agent must be given information
rents (in the form of a transfer/budget over and above the minimum monetary cost of pro-
duction) as long as the low-productivity agent is asked to provide a positive level of output.
Moreover, the high-productivity agent will be asked to produce the full-information level. Fur-
thermore, if shirking is a concern then the agent will need to be given the appropriate monetary
incentives to exert the appropriate level of e¤ort. Also, if e¤ort is productivity-enhancing then
the agent will be asked to provide, given productivity, the full-information level of services. In
addition, incentives must be high-powered.12 These ndings are in contrast to the main results
of our study mentioned in the Introduction.
Many applications of the principal-agent paradigm to public organisations emphasise
also the possible multiplicity of an agencys principals, the multiplicity of tasks, measurement
problems, the possible team-production elements and career concerns.13 In doing so, they inves-
11Note that the Baron and Myerson model, where the agent is money-motivated and there is no administrative
constraint, is used also in Dixit (2002a) for the discussion of adverse selection problems in public service delivery.
12See, for instance, La¤ont and Martimort (2002, Chs. 2, 4, 7.2).
13See, for instance, Rose-Ackerman (1986), Tirole (1994), Dewatripont et al. (1999), Burgess and Metcalfe
(1999), Dixit (2002a). For a related discussion see also Bennett and Iossa (2005).
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tigate how the lessons of the standard principal-agent model have to be modied before being
applied to the public sector. In most of this strand of research, however, prot-maximisation
is still the maintained objective of the agency. In addition, agents are implicitly assumed to be
able to use their own resources in order to manipulate the transmission of information to the
principal(s).14
In this work, we abstract from issues of multiple tasks and/or career concerns and/or
non-cooperation within the agency and/or within the decision-making body which is respon-
sible for the agencys budget. We do not choose to do so because we believe that such issues
are unimportant. Instead, we do so because we wish to focus on the implications for the
design of mission-orientated organisations of the coexistence of intrinsic motivation and admin-
istrative constraint as a rst step towards the study and understanding of more complicated
environments.
Our paper is related to the work by Francois (2000,2003 and 2004) in that agents have a
non-pecuniary motivation. However, there this motivation arises out of pure altruism and not
due to warm glowaltruism. In the spirit of private provision of public goods, pure altruism
leads to a free-riding problem in donations of labour. Moreover, there, outcome-based wages are
not used. In fact, either moral hazard is not a problem, due to the on-spot veriability of e¤ort,
or wages are at with constant wages be e¢ cient (i.e. above the market wage) whenever
e¤ort can be veried with a lag. Furthermore, information-eliciting monetary schemes are either
not needed or not used. In Francois (2000 and 2003) emphasis is also placed on the lack of
commitment on the part of the employer not to turn the agents donated labour into prot when
the employer is the residual claimant of any generated prots and can a¤ect production after
the donation of labour. Lack of commitment is not an issue here. Given these characteristics,
these papers investigate when the power of incentives and/or e¢ ciency wagesare lower in the
nonprot sector and/or when nonprot organisations dominate for-prot rms in the provision
of public goods. The main insight of these papers is that free-riding is less severe in public and
non-prot organisations as, in these organisations, there is no residual claimant and hence the
principal of such organisations is less inclined to make up for the agentsshirking.
14Notice here that Dixit (2002b) uses output-motivation in a multi-tasking model to discuss provision of social
services. Dixit (1997) uses output-motivation in a multi-tasking and multi-principal model to discuss the power
of incentives in public organisations. However, in both works, the agency relationship is not characterised by an
administrative constraint.
7
Page 9 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Our work is also related to Glazer (2004) and Besley and Ghatak (2005). They too
assume that motivation arises due to warm glowaltruism and investigate the implications for
collective production.
In Glazer (2004), the principal contributes also to the production. The focus there is
on the possible lack of commitment on the part of the principal not to utilise the agents
donated labour merely to increase prots by means of adjusting his input after the agent has
exerted her e¤ort. It turns out that when the employers input and the agents e¤ort are
non-contractible, higher commitment may lead to lower output. This would be the case if the
inputs are substitutes in the production of output and the workers input is su¢ ciently less
productive than capital (the employers input). The rst condition ensures that the outcome
under commitment features higher e¤ort and lower capital relative to the non-commitment
outcome, while the second condition ensures that this will result in a net decrease in production.
Here, instead, the principal does not supply any input, so no commitment issues arise.
In Besley and Ghatak (2005), output levels (for given productivity) are xed. Thus,
that work may not be well-suited for the study of organisations whose output can vary for
given productivity. That work focuses, instead, on the matching of principals and agents vis-
a-vis mission-orientation, and the e¤ects on productivity and the power of incentives. Here,
we investigate the e¤ect of mission-motivation on production and associated monetary costs
for given productivity. Furthermore our focus is on the short-run (i.e. on an environment
where assortative matching between principals and agents has not yet taken place). Due
to these di¤erences in focus, one can view our work as complementary to theirs. In fact,
some of our ndings echo results in Besley and Ghatak (2005), including the substitutability
between intrinsic and external incentives. Nevertheless, many of our results, such as the ones
we emphasise above on the levels of production at optimum, also do not have counterparts
there.
Finally, our work is also related to Delfgaauw and Dur (2008). There not all agents are
mission-motivated, and intrinsic motivation and productivity are the agentsprivate informa-
tion. Also, mission-motivated agents are by assumption high-productivity workers. Moreover,
workers are not restricted by an administrative constraint. The question there is whether
the principal nds it optimal to attract both motivated agents and prot-maximising-low-
productivity agents. The answer is a¢ rmative. Also, it is shown that when the principal
attracts both motivated and prot-maximising, but equally productive, agents, he implements
8
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distortions in the output of all workers. However, this result relies partly on the fact that the
principal can choose the size of the workforce and partly on the fact that the principal minimises
the production costs of a given level of public services. So, decreasing the prot-maximising
agentsoutput to reduce the rents that are surrendered to the motivated agents in that set-up,
requires an increase in the motivated agentsoutput to maintain total output.15 Our result, on
the other hand, relies on the coexistence of mission-motivation and administrative constraints
on the part of the single worker responsible for the production of an endogenous output.
3 The Model
Our model consists of an agent and her principal. The agency is the sole producer of a good
valued only by the principal. The agency can be thought of as a group of citizens who have
an expertise in the production of a non-marketable good, that is, in the attainment of the
(public) agencys or the nonprot organisations mandated goal. The principal can be thought
of as the decision-making body that has the authority of passing legislation for determining the
interaction of the polity with the public bureau or as the board of stakeholders of a nonprot
organisation who are responsible for determining the budget of the agency and how it is linked
with the organisations performance.
In general, the non-marketable nature of the service may also imply the non-veriability
and thereby the non-contractibility of the agencys attained goals. It is crucial therefore to
emphasise here, in order to avoid any misunderstandings, that what we refer hereafter to as
an agencys output may di¤er from its mandated goal. In fact, as Baker (1992) and Heckman
et al. (1997) among others emphasise, readily measured performance targets often substitute
for the mandated goals of an agency, which are often non-veriable. Such targets are what we
refer, hereafter, to as the agencys (intermediate) output.16
15See, for more details, Delfgaauw and Dur (2008).
16The distinction we make here between an agencys mandated goal and (intermediate) output is essentially
very similar to the distinction made in Wilson (1989, pp. 32-34) between a public bureaus goalsand (critical)
tasks (see also HM Treasury 2000, p..2). The agencies we have in mind can in general be divided into what
Wilson (1989) refers to as production and procedural organisations. For the former, the goal and the critical
task coincide and can be veried (see Wilson 1989, pp. 35, 160-162, 244). In the case of procedural agencies,
the mandated goal is not veriable, but the critical task is (see Wilson 1989, pp. 320-323, 163-164, 202).
As an example, tax and pensions administration bureaus are production agencies. Universities and bureaus
9
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Denote with q the veriable measure of the agents performance (towards the attainment
of the agencys mandated goal). Assume that q  0. For the purposes of our model, the
monetary cost (in terms of the numeraire good) of production of q units of the agencys (inter-
mediate) output is given by C(q; ) = F + q; where F  0 and  > 0 are scalars. The xed
cost of production F is common knowledge.17 The marginal cost of the agencys production
(or the inverse of the agencys productivity)  can take either of two values. In particular
 2 f1; 2g with respective probabilities s and 1   s: These probabilities are common knowl-
edge. Let   2  1 > 0: Thus, from the principals point of view, 2  s is the expected
productivity of the agent.
In this paper we view the agent as a specialist in the production of the output. Specically,
we postulate that the likelihood of the marginal cost being low may depend on the e¤ortor
managerial inputput by the agent, with more e¤ort leading to lower expected marginal cost
(or higher expected productivity). Thus, output may in general depend stochastically on e¤ort
through the e¤ect of the latter on the productivity of the agency. Also, the e¤ort may not be
contractible. In addition, the agent may have superior information about productivity after
e¤ort has been exerted.18
In fact, we focus here on an environment where  is private information of the agency.
We also assume in the main text that the relationship between the principal and the agency is
not hindered by moral hazard, so neither the realisation of the marginal cost of production nor
the level of output, for given marginal cost, depends on some non-contractible activities of the
agency. The reasons are the following. First, there are many public organisations where moral
that administer military procurement and the army during peacetime are, instead, examples of procedural
organisations.
17Our results are qualitatively robust to allowing for a general cost function C(q; ) with Cq > 0; Cqq  0;
Cq > 0 and C(0; ) = F; where F  0 is a scalar. Note our assumption that the xed cost F is common
knowledge. This assumption avoids the emergence of multi-dimensional adverse selection and allows us to
isolate the consequences for the optimal contract of the presence of the administrative constraint when the agent
is a not-for-prot entity.
18The monetary cost of production C(q; ) can also be thought of as being a reduced form of a more complicated
model where, along the lines of Francois (2000, 2003, and 2004), lower-tier workers are paid e¢ ciencyor at
wages which are determined by the agencys head, with the productivity of the agency being stochastically
dependent on the heads managerial e¤ort to monitor the agencys workers.
10
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hazard is not a major problem,19 yet the agent may still have superior information over the true
monetary costs of running the department.20 Second, as we show in Appendix C our results
would be qualitatively valid for a large range of parameters even if moral hazard was the only
concern21 or in a hybridenvironment where the realisation of the marginal cost of production
is the agents private information and depends in a stochastic manner on non-contractible
activities of the agent.
The principal derives a utility B(q) from the agents output; with B(0) = 0; B0 > 0;
B0(0) > 2; limq!1B0(q) = 0; B00 < 0 and B000 < 0.22 Notice here that this representation
of the principals preferences can also capture an environment where q is the intermediate
output of the agency. To see this, suppose that ~B(y) is the principals utility over the agencys
mandated goal y; and that this nal output is given by y = Y (q): Suppose now that Y (:) is
known by both the principal and the agent, but non-veriable by a third-party. Then, despite
the fact that y is non-contractible, the principal and the agent can calculateB(q)  ~B(Y (q)):
We follow the accounting convention that the principal bears up-front the xed cost of
setting up the agency. Therefore, xed costs do not a¤ect the decision of the agent to participate
and transmit information. The utility on the part of the principal after having borne the xed
19Wilson (1989) refers to these kinds of public organisation as agencies with standard operating procedures.
The term standard operating procedures refers to the fact that bureaucratic slack for such agencies is not a
major concern due to inputs-monitoring. In such organisations, the actions of the employees are observable and
there are processes that pertain to the observable actions. Political principal(s) of such an agency can determine
how allocations are related to certain standard operating procedures and possess a veriable measure of the
agencys performance. Examples of such public agencies are the army during peacetime, bureaus that administer
(military) procurement and tax collection, and transfer agencies where most of expenditure is simply passing
through (like agencies that administer pensions). For discussions on process-monitoring in public organisations,
see Wilson (1989, pp. 35, 133, 159-164, 202, 221, 244, 320-323, 375), Prendergast (2003) and Dixit (2002). For
a model of endogenous process monitoring see Novaes and Zingales (2003) and Francois (2003).
20See, for instance, Bendor et al. (1985) and Horn (1995, p. 87). As an example, civil servants in the
Department of Defence often have superior knowledge on weapons systems and how they enhance military
capability. Similarly, civil servants responsible for processing tax invoices and retirement benets have better
information on whether more (advanced or in number) computers will enable them to administer claims in a
more e¢ cient way.
21The interaction of output-motivation with moral hazard has been analysed by Francois (2000, 2003, and
2004) and Besley and Ghatak (2005).
22The latter assumption ensures a well-behaved optimisation problem on the part of the principal.
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cost is then dened by
Up(q; t) = B(q)  t;
where t  0 is the budget allocated by the principal to the agency (i.e. the units of the
composite good transferred to the agency):23 We also assume that the principals wealth net
of xed costs is su¢ ciently high, so that he will not face any binding wealth constraints.
Dene with t q the agencys prots, appropriation or discretionary budget. This budget
is a source of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benets for the agency: bureaucrats consume
the discretionary budget in the form of both wages and perquisites. The agency also derives
direct utility from providing q units of the output. We capture this non-pecuniary motive by
assuming that the agent maximises
U(q; t; ; a)  aB(q) + t  q; (1)
where a > 0.
Crucially, aB(q) is non-contractible. The parameter a represents the extent of the agents
output-motivation that arises from warm glow altruismrelative to the marginal utility of the
discretionary budget.24 Clearly then the case of a!1 reects an output-maximising agency,
and, at the other extreme, the case of a! 0 represents at the limit a prot-maximising agent.
In the standard study of procurement and regulation it is assumed that a = 0:25 Note also
that a can also be thought of capturing, independent of monetary incentives, the quality of
matching between the principals and the agents preferences in terms of the agencys goal.
In other words, a can be thought of representing the extent of the agencys sense of mission,
along the lines of Wilson (1989, pp. 26, 95 etc). We refer hereafter to a as the not-for-
prot/mission/output/intrinsic motive of the agent. Assume that a is common knowledge.26
23Qualitatively, our results are robust to allowing for a general welfare function on the part of the principal
Up(q; t; ); with Up being concave with respect to q; decreasing with t and qo1 > q
o
2 where q
o
i = arg maxq
Up(q; iq; i):
24Notice that, in principle, there is nothing in our model thus far to preclude the case that B(q) are the
principals prots. In fact, our model would also be compatible with an environment where aB(q) are monetary
returns on the part of the agents that, however, are non-contractible. This could, for instance, be the case if a
is observable but non-veriable. I would like to thank Tim Besley for bringing this into my attention.
25As we will see later on, the limiting solution of our model with a! 0 does correspond to the solution of the
standard problem where a = 0.
26An implicit assumption in most of the literature is that preferences of civil servants are common knowledge.
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Three important and related observations about the agents preferences have to be made.
First, the agents welfare is not necessarily decreasing with output, as is the case in the canonical
principal-agent model. Second, balanced-budget increases in production are welfare-enhancing
for the agent, with the gain being increasing with the mission motivation a: Third, the marginal
rate of substitution between output q and budget appropriation t is B0(q) for the principal and
 aB0(q) for the agent. Thus, the higher the output motivation a; the lower the compensation
the principal needs to give to the agent for increasing production marginally, while keeping the
agents utility constant.
Let ti and qi be the budget appropriation and the required output if the marginal pro-
duction cost is i; i = 1; 2: Any feasible relationship between the principal and the agent must
satisfy certain constraints. First, we assume that the agent cannot be coerced by the principal
to participate in some mechanism for the determination of some allocation: Accordingly, feasi-
ble allocations must leave the agency at least as well o¤ as the agencys outside option. In this
model the principal is the only buyer of the agencys expertise, and hence the agents utility
from taking up the outside option is equal to zero:27 To induce the agency to produce the
output regardless of the underlying productivity, the following condition must be satised:28
aB(qi) + ti  iqi; 8i 2 f1:2g: (2)
Second, we assume the presence of an administrative constraint: the budget cannot fall short of
the monetary costs of production the agent faces. One of the implications of the administrative
The same is true for the preferences of the mission-motivated agents in Besley and Ghatak (2005). In principle,
a could also be private information on the part of the agency. However, in this paper the focus is on asymmetric
information with respect to : The reason is again to isolate the consequences for the optimal contract of the
agency being characterised by an administrative constraint and being a not-for-prot entity. For a discussion
of when productivity is common-knowledge but mission-motivation is the workers private information, see
Delfgaaw and Dur (2007).
27All that is needed for our results is that the reservation utility is su¢ ciently low. Again the reason for as-
suming zero reservation utilities is to isolate the consequences of administrative constraints in mission-orientated
agencies.
28As it will become obvious shortly, our results are robust to assuming, instead, that  is on-task rather than
innate productivity and hence that the ex ante participation constraint s[aB(q1)+ t1  1q1] + (1  s)[aB(q2)+
t2   2q2]  0 must be satised.
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constraint is that the following limited-liability constraint must hold:
ti  iqi; 8i 2 f1:2g: (3)
Note that, due to a > 0, the limited-liability constraint makes the participation constraint in
(2) redundant. Hence we ignore in what follows the latter:
It is important for the understanding of our results to note that the administrative
constraint is similar to, yet not the same as, a limited-liability constraint The reason is that
the administrative constraint also a¤ects the agents ability to pretend she is of a di¤erent cost-
type, while the standard limited-liability does not a¤ect the agents opportunities to conceal
convincingly her productivity (see for instance Sappington, 1986, and La¤ont and Martimort,
2002, Ch 2). In more detail, note that, due to t2  2q2 and 2 > 1; any allocation intended for
the ine¢ cient agent can also be administered by the low marginal cost agent (i.e. t2 > 1q2).
Crucially, however, the reverse may not be true: t1 < 2q1 can in principle be the case, which
implies, given the administrative constraint t1  1q1, that a high-cost agency will not be able
to execute the allocation ft1; q1g.
Assuming the existence of a perfect and benevolent device which ensures the enforce-
ment of contracts, we have by the revelation principle29 that the principal cannot do better
than o¤ering a direct revelation mechanism: Under such a mechanism, incentive-compatibility
conditions must be satised,30 yet the administrative constraint lalso limits the opportunities
for under-reporting costs, since (recall from above) it may be the case that t1 < 2q1. Thus,
incentive-compatibility requires here that the agent of a certain cost-type has no incentive to
choose a contract that he can administer and is intended for producers of a di¤erent type. That
is,
aB(q1) + t1   1q1  aB(q2) + t2   1q2 and (4)
aB(q2) + t2   2q2  aB(q1) + t1   2q1 when t1  2q1: (5)
To re-emphasise the di¤erence between a limited-liability and an administrative constraint,
note that under the former and in the absence of the latter, (5) would have been replaced by
the more stringent condition aB(q2) + t2   2q2  aB(q1) + t1   2q1:
29See, for instance, Mas-Colell et al. (1995, Ch. 23).
30Note that we restrict our analysis to the case of deterministic contracts. This can be motivated by postulating
that stochastic allocation rules are hard to be enforced by a court of law.
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Let i  ti   iqi; i = 1; 2; be the type-i agents information rents. Using the deni-
tion of information rents to eliminate ti, we have that the principals problem is to maximise
Ei [B(qi)   iqi   i] with respect to fi; qigi2f1;2g subject to qi  0; i = 1; 2; the incentive-
compatibility constraints
1  2 +q2   a[B(q1) B(q2)]; (6)
2  1  q1 + a[B(q1) B(q2)] when 1  q1; (7)
and the limited-liability constraints
1  0; (8)
2  0: (9)
We turn to the solution of this problem after we analyse some useful benchmark cases.
4 Benchmark Cases
Before we investigate the solution to the above problem we examine four benchmark cases.
The analysis of these cases will help the understanding of the forthcoming results and empha-
sise that they rely critically on the coexistence of mission-motivation and the administrative
constraint. We start by nding the optimal allocations when information is symmetric. These
allocations are denoted with the superscript o: When information is symmetric, the incentive-
compatibility constraints (6) and (7) are irrelevant. Thus, the principal is restricted only by the
administrative constraints (8)and (9): It follows in a straightforward manner that the principal
is better o¤ by leaving no excess budget(information rents) to the agency (i.e. toi = iq
o
i for
any i 2 (1; 2)). Also, the level of output qoi satises:
B0(qoi ) = i; 8i 2 f1; 2g: (10)
Note that qo1 > q
o
2 > 0. We refer to these allocations as the full-information contract and q
o
as the e¢ cient (from the principals point of view) level of production. For a given marginal
cost of production ; the principal will indeed o¤er the contract in question to the agency
and output will be produced if the net value of public service delivery B(qoi )   (iqoi + F ) is
non-negative. Assume that
B(qo2)  (2qo2 + F )  0: (11)
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This ensures that the agency is set up under complete information.
Next, we consider the case the agent is a prot-maximising entity (i.e. a = 0) and can
pretend to be of any cost-type regardless of the associated allocation. Here, the incentive-
compatibility constraints (6) and (7) reduce to j  k + (k   j)qk; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= k. The
principals problem is then maxfiqigi=1;2fs[B(q1)   q1   1] + (1   s)[B(q2)   q2   2] s.t.
j  k + (k   j)qk and i  0; qi  0; i; j; k = 1; 2; j 6= kg: As is well-known, in this case
the ine¢ cient agency attains utility equal to that under its outside option (i.e. 2 = 0) while
the e¢ cient agency is given just enough utility to prevent it from claiming that it is ine¢ cient
(i.e. 1 = q2). In addition, the e¢ cient agent would produce qo1; while the ine¢ cient agent
would produce maxf0; B0 1(2+ s1 s)g < qo2. The high-cost agents output strikes a balance
between distorting downwards its production and reducing the low-cost agents information
rents.31 Notice also that here the power of incentives (i.e. the reward from reporting truthfully
that productivity is high) is 1 2 = q2: Assume, hereafter, that a prot-maximising entity
is never shut-down. That is, q2 > 0.32
Suppose now that there were no administrative constraint, but a > 0: An increase in
the intrinsic motivation leads to a preference for higher production, so if q1 > q2; then the
high-productivity agent has a lower incentive to over-report costs, while the low-productivity
agent has a higher incentive to under-report costs. One might expect that this could lead
to qualitatively di¤erent incentives to the ones above. However, this is not the case. Let
Ui  i + aB(qi) be the agents utility. Then, the incentive-compatibility constraints would
be Uj  Uk + (k   j)qk; k; j; 1; 2; k 6= j; and the participation constraints Ui  0 would be
relevant. The principals net surplus could be rewritten as (1 + a)B(q)   q   U  S(q; a)  
q   U: Thus, the principals problem would be equivalent to the textbook model of adverse
selection above. In particular, one would only need to replace B(:) with S(:), and  with U:
Thus, it is still the case that the low-productivity agents production is distorted downwards
to reduce the utility rents, U1 = ; of the high-productivity agent who produces at the full-
information level. Also, the low-productivity agent is given zero rents, U2 = 0. Due to intrinsic
motivation, the latter implies a negative net monetary transfer 2 =  aB(q2) < 0; which
captures the donated labourof the agent. Investigating this case in more detail could be of
31See, for instance, La¤ont and Martimort (2002, Ch. 2) for more details.
32 In general, if s is high enough shut-down may be optimal.
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interest for certain cases of public services. However, it is out of the scope of the present work,
where we take the view that wealth-constraints are an important characteristic of many service
providers. It is worth noticing, however, in passing that in this benchmark case output would
be increasing with the not-for-prot motive, regardless of productivity and whether information
about productivity is symmetric or not.
Finally, if the administrative constraint were present and a = 0, then the predictions
would e¤ectively be the ones of the canonical paradigm. The reason is very simple: with no
output-motivation (i.e. a = 0) feasibility of mis-reporting only relaxes the ine¢ cient producers
incentive-compatibility constraint (vis-a-vis the canonical model) which is redundant anyway
in designing the optimal contract.
5 The Optimal Agency
We now turn to the main focus of our work: the derivation of the optimal contract when the
agent is both output-motivated and wealth-constrained. Compared to the problem when the
agent is a prot-maximising entity and there is no administrative constraint, we have that the
minimum information rents that ensure participation are still equal to zero. Nevertheless, our
problem here is not a standard adverse selection problem. The reason is twofold. First, due
to the administrative constraint, the producer is, in e¤ect, wealth-constrained, and thereby
the high-cost incentive-compatibility constraint is less stringent, all other things equal, in the
sense that if 1 < q1; then the high-cost agent cannot under-report her costs.33 Second,
conditional on mis-reporting costs being feasible (i.e. 1  q1) and q1 > q2, mission-
motivation (i.e. a > 0) makes under-reporting costs more attractive and, crucially for our
purposes, over-reporting costs less attractive. That is, the low-cost (resp. high-cost) incentive-
compatibility constraint is relaxed (resp. becomes more stringent). The stronger these e¤ects
are, the higher the mission-motivation is. This is a direct consequence of the fact that for any
given information rents, , the agent values output directly by aB(q).
In what follows, let us denote with (i (a); q

i (a)); i = 1; 2; the optimal contract o¤ered to
the agency, given the utility parameter a:34 Consider now the full-information contract. Under
this contract o1 = 0 < q
o
1; and thereby the less productive agent cannot claim that she
33See also, for instance, Che and Gale (2000).
34We suppress the obvious dependence of the optimal contract on s:
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is more productive. Also, o2 = 0 and q
o
1 > q
o
2: Thus, the low-cost agency has no incentive
to over-report costs if a  qo2B(qo1) B(qo2)  a
o > 0 and the full-information contract can be
implemented.
We thus have
Proposition 1 (The E¢ cient Regime) If a  ao we have that qi (a) = qoi and
ti (a) = iq

i (a); for any i = 1; 2:
Thus, if the not-for-prot motive of the agent is high enough, the exchange relationship
between the principal and the output-provider will be e¢ cient, even if the productivity of the
agency is its private information. That is, the e¢ ciency properties of the workings of the agency
are not compromised.
Turn now to the case of a < ao: In this case, the output-motivation of the agent is
su¢ ciently low so that the incentive to over-report costs, in order to achieve an increase in
prots by qo2, dominates the incentive to produce a high level of output due to mission
motivation. Clearly, then the optimal contract fi (a); qi (a)gi2f1;2g will di¤er from the full-
information contract.
Recall our assumption from Section 4 that a prot-maximising agency would never be
shut-down. This implies that the agency is set up regardless of its mission-motivation and
regardless of its cost-type.35 In presenting the corresponding optimum mechanism it will prove
useful to employ the following denitions:
q^i(a); for any i = 1; 2; are dened by
B0(q^1(a)) = 1=(1 + a) and (12)
q^2(a) = argmax
q0
f[1  s(1 + a)]B(q)  2q[1  s+ s
2
]g;
qi(a) > 0; for any i = 1; 2; are dened by the solution of the system
aB0(q1(a))
aB0(q2(a)) + 
=   s[B
0(q1(a))  1]
(1  s)[B0(q2(a))  2] and (13)
aB(q2(a)) + q2(a) = aB(q1(a)):
35A straightforward application of the envelope theorem implies that, as was expected, under no shut-down
higher motivation is always benecial for the principal if a < ao. Also, if the high-cost agency is shut down the
low-cost agent is e¢ cient, and hence the principals payo¤ is, crucially, independent of the agents motivation.
Moreover, as we will see shortly, as a ! 0 the optimal no shut-down contract approximates the corresponding
contract under a = 0: These observations imply, directly, that if a prot-maximising agency operates regardless
of its productivity, so does an intrinsically motivated agent.
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It turns out that when we examine the optimal mechanism we can ignore the incentive-
compatibility constraint for the high-cost agency (7). As in the typical model, this constraint is
satised ex post. We can also ignore the constraint q1(a)  0: In addition, we have that the low-
cost agencys incentive compatibility constraint is binding. Also binding is the high-cost agents
limited-liability constraint.36 Thus the optimal contract is given by fNi (a); qNi (a)gi2f1;2g with
N2 (a) = 0; 
N
1 (a) = 
N
2 (a)   a[B(qN1 )   B(qN2 )] + qN2 (a); and qNi (a), for any i = 1; 2;
maximising
s[(1 + a)B(q1)  (aB(q2) + q2 + 1q1)] + (1  s)[B(q2)  2q2] (14)
subject to
q2  0 and
aB(q2) + q2  aB(q1):
Note that the latter constraint is nothing else but the limited-liability constraint for the low-cost
agency, when (a) this agency is indi¤erent between the contract designed for it and the contract
designed for the high-cost agent, and (b) the high-cost agencys limited-liability constraint is
binding. It follows that production under this scheme is given by37
qNi (a) = q^i(a) > 0; for any i = 1; 2; if aB(q^2(a)) + q^2(a)  aB(q^1(a)) (15)
or
qNi (a) = qi(a), for any i = 1; 2; if aB(q^2(a)) + q^2(a) < aB(q^1(a)): (16)
Accordingly, with this scheme, production is strictly positive regardless of the agents
cost-type, and output is increasing with the agents productivity (i.e. qN1 (a) > q
N
2 (a)).
38 More
interestingly, output distortions occur regardless of the agents type. In particular, we have in
a straightforward manner from a < ao; conditions (15) and (16) and the denitions of q^i(a)
and qi(a) i = 1; 2, that 0 < qN2 (a) < q
o
2 < q
o
1 < q
N
1 (a). That is, the high-cost agency under-
supplies and the low-cost agency oversupplies the valued services. In addition, as expected,
36See Appendix A for more details.
37See Appendix B for the derivation.
38Note that under this solution we have that N1 (a) qN1 (a) = a[B(qN2 (a)) B(qN1 (a))] +(qN2 (a) qN1 (a))
< 0 and N2 (a) N1 (a)+qN1 (a)   a[B(qN1 (a)) B(qN2 (a))] = (qN1 (a)  qN2 (a)) > 0; and thus the high-cost
agency does not nd it either feasible or optimal to mis-report its cost-type.
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problems of excess production cost may arise. The reason is that now the low-cost agencys
limited-liability constraint may be slack (i.e. the low-cost agency may enjoy information rents).
This will be the case if and only if aB(q^2(a)) + q^2(a) > aB(q^1(a)); or, after re-arranging,
a 2 (0; q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a))), yet in contrast to the case when the agent is not output-motivated,
the low-cost agency may also produce at minimum cost despite the high-cost agencys output
being positive. This occurs when a  q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a)) :
To understand the above contract,39 recall that if a < ao the low-cost agency, when o¤ered
the full-information contract, does have an incentive to over-report costs. As in the canonical
model, then we have that the less-productive agency is given no information rents, 2 = 0: Also,
the low-cost agents incentive-compatibility constraint is binding, and the principal distorts
downwards the production of the high-cost agent to decrease the information rents of the
more productive agent. However, here, due to the agent being outp t-motivated, information
rents can also be reduced by distorting upwards the production of the low-cost agent. To see
this, note that a binding low-cost incentive-compatibility constraint implies that 1 = q2
  a[B(q1)   B(q2)]  (q1; q2; a;); so (non-negative) information rents (q1; q2; a;) are
decreasing with q1, as well as increasing with q2: Thus, the principal has an incentive to decrease
the output of the high-cost agent and increase the output of the low-cost agent. The optimal
production levels strike a balance between distortions and excessive production costs by the low-
cost agency, as in the canonical model. In fact, note that problem (14), which gives the solution
qNi (a) i = 1; 2; can be written as maxqi0fs[B(q1) 1q1 (q1; q2; a;)]+(1 s)[B(q2) 2q2]
s.t. (q1; q2; a;)  0g: Finally, the fact that the principal has two (distorting) instruments
may enable him to expropriat all rents, even if the high-cost agents output is positive.
We refer to the above mechanism (irrespective of the existence of rents) as the No-Shut-
Down Regime/Contract. It follows then directly that
Proposition 2 (The Second-Best Regime) If a < ao; the second-best contract is the
No-Shut-Down contract.
To summarise our discussion thus far, let us identify the following cases, depending on
39Taking the limit of the solution of our model as a! 0 we nd that our solution approximates the solution
of the standard adverse selection problem. To see this dene qNi (0)  lima!0 qNi (a) for any i = 1; 2; and observe
that as a! 0 we have a[B(q^2(a)) B(q^1(a))] + q^2(a)  0: Hence note from (15) and (16) that qN1 (0) = qo1 > qo2
> qN2 (0) = minf0; B0 1(2 + s1 s)g: Finally, we have that the high-cost agent operates at minimum cost and
the low-cost agency enjoys information rents equal to qN2 (0):
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the strength of the intrinsic motive. First we have the e¢ cient regime. This occurs if and only
if a  ao: In this case; the agency produces the full-information level of output at minimum
cost, regardless of its productivity.
Then, we have the second-best regime. This regime occurs if and only if the not-for-
prot motive is su¢ ciently low, a < ao: Now, the low-productivity agency under-produces,
while the high-productivity agency over-produces. Also, the low-productivity agency is always
productively e¢ cient (i.e. never enjoys information rents) while the high-productivity provider
may or may not be productively e¢ cient. Specically, the production plan fq1(a); q2(a)g will
be such that 0 < q2(a) = qN2 (a) < qo2 < qo1 < q1(a) = qN1 (a): Also, the low-cost agent will enjoy
rents if and only if the not-for-prot motive is very low (i.e. a 2 [0; q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a)))).
Our results are in striking contrast to those of the canonical model. First, if a  ao; then
the agency operates under the full-information contract regardless of its cost-type. Second, if
a < ao, then the low-cost agency over-produces and it can be productively e¢ cient even if the
high-cost agent produces a positive level. Clearly, then, using the lessons from the canonical
principal-agent model in the design of collective-goods provision may be a misguided reform
agenda.
6 Discussion of Results
Recall that when output-motivation is su¢ ciently high (i.e. a  ao) then provision of collective
goods is e¢ cient from the principals point of view. This implies that output is independent
of the intrinsic motivation. The reason is that the principals net surplus from the provision of
collective goods is independent of the agents intrinsic motivation.
In the canonical model (i.e. without motivation and administrative constraint) compe-
tition between agents for the right to produce the output valued by the principal can be ben-
ecial. In more detail, if the principal is faced with a pool of agents, then it is more likely for
low-cost agents to emerge. Also, given a single, incentive-compatible and individually-rational
job opening, agents would self-select themselves. That is, high-cost agents would choose the
ft2; q2g sub-contract and the low-cost agents would select the ft1; q1g terms of employment.40
In this environment, the principal would have appointed a low-cost agent, if present, to ensure
a higher net surplus. It is interesting to note that in our set-up we arrive at an additional
40For a related discussion of a similar point see Hoxby (1999).
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channel through which competition may be benecial. Specically, if the polity is faced with a
pool of expertsfor the provision of public services, who all have the same cost-type which is
nevertheless unknown to the (political) principal, then the principal would have appointed an
agency which is characterised by su¢ ciently high motivation (i.e. a  ao) to ensure e¢ cient
provision of public services: Therefore, introducing competition at the supply-side of the pro-
vision of collective goods will improve the e¢ ciency properties of the workings of an agency by
making it more likely that agents with high intrinsic motivation emerge.41
Let us turn to the case of distorted production (i.e. a < ao):We nd that low-productivity
agencies under-produce, while high-productivity agencies over-produce. To understand the
relevance of this result, note that popular accounts of public bureaucracy view the latter as
highly ine¢ cient and the reason for oversized public sectors. Also, this perspective has often
been used as an argument in favour of privatisation and introduction of competition in public
services. The most inuential scholarly support to such views can, arguably, be found in
Niskanen (1971). The paradigm of empire-building bureaucrats has been largely discounted
in the much celebrated work of Wilson (1989).42 Specically, using a number of case studies,
Wilson argues that many of the popular accounts of overextended bureaucracies are often driven
by common misperceptions. He provides examples of large agencies but also counter-examples
of many underproviding bureaus. Interestingly, then, our results on the production levels are
consistent with many case-studies in Wilson. Though there may as well be other alternative
explanations to these observations, the one given by our study is that low-productivity agencies
underproduce and high-productivity agencies overproduce, and both directions of ine¢ cient
provision are part of the optimal organisational design as a response to the information problems
encountered by the principals of these agencies.
A common belief in the recent debates over reforming public services is that the higher
the intrinsic motivation of service providers or the higher the sense of mission within agencies,
the higher the level of provision. A typical example of such arguments is Wilson (1989). In
that work (p. 95), a culture that is widely shared and warmly endorsed by operators and
41For related discussions on how politicians decide which agencies to create see, for instance, McCubbins
(1985), Calvert et al. (1989) and Banks and Weingast (1992). See also Besley and Ghatak (2005) for a related
discussion which emphasises the importance of higher diversity in allowing for better matching, in terms of
mission-preference, between principals and agents.
42See Ch 7 and pp. 180-181.
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managers alikeis viewed as the chief wayto induce good performance (see also, for instance,
pp. 98, 100, 101, 108, 109 and 110). In terms of our model, this would be reected in a and
output being positively related. However, as we show below, this is not necessarily a feature
of an optimally designed bureau. In fact, our study emphasises that in certain cases, optimal
organisational design implies that output increases with higher mission-motivation, and in
other cases, provision of social services will decrease as a result of higher intrinsic motivation.
The reason is simple. The common perception is correct when mission-motivation and level
of provision are viewed in isolation from monetary incentives. However, when intrinsic and
explicit incentives are analysed jointly, then this common belief may be misguided.
To get a closer look at how levels of provision depend on the not-for-prot motive,
consider, rst, the case of the low-cost agency enjoying information rents. Recall that in
this case qNi (a) = q^i(a) > 0; i = 1; 2: Clearly then a marginal increase in the not-for-prot
motive will increase the low-cost agencys output while decreasing the less productive agencys
production. To understand this, recall that in this case the principal surrender information
rents, which are equal to (q1; q2; a;) = q2   a[B(q1)   B(q2)]. Note then that @2@a@q1 =
 B0(q1) and that @21@a@q2 = B0(q2): Thus, and after recalling that q1 > q2; motivation and
output of the high-productivity agent are complements while output-orientation and output
of the high-cost agent are substitutes in the reduction of excessive monetary production costs.
Therefore, higher mission-motivation leads the principal to reduce by more the output of the
high-cost agent and increase by more the high-productivity agents output.
Let us turn our attention now to the case of the agency being productively e¢ cient,
regardless of its cost-type. In this case, the e¤ect of a higher not-for-prot motive on the output
of the agency is ambiguous. To see this, recall rst that an increase in the mission-motivation,
a; results in a decrease of the information rents, all other things equal. Also, rents are increasing
(resp. decreasing) with the production level of the least (resp. most) productive agent. Thus, if,
at optimum, the agent is not left any rents, as would be the case if he was productively e¢ cient,
then limited-liability implies that an increase in mission-motivation requires an increase in the
production of the least productive agent and/or a decrease in the production of the more
productive agent. However, these e¤ects will be counteracted by the fact that, as we have
seen immediately above, intrinsic motivation and output of the high-productivity agent are
complements while mission-orientation and output of the high-cost agent are substitutes in the
reduction of excessive monetary production costs. Therefore, the net e¤ect of higher mission-
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motivation on the output of a productively e¢ cient bureau will depend on the balance of these
opposing e¤ects.
Therefore, in contrast to common belief, developing a user-orientated culture in the
provision of collective goods will not necessarily increase the level of provision. Interestingly,
note that this may be true regardless of production costs. This counter-intuitive implication
for the optimal design of organisations that provide social services follows, as we have seen
above, from the interaction of monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation. Our result that
the e¤ect of mission-motivation on output is ambiguous echoes that of Glazer (2004) in a
di¤erent context. Here, the principal does not contribute any real input into the production,
while in Glazer the principals and agents inputs are substitutes and the principal can commit
on the level of his input prior to the agent contributing hers.
Next, we discuss the power of incentives. The power of incentives is dened here as the
di¤erence [t1(a) 1q1(a)] [t2(a) 2q2(a)]  P (a): Thus, the power of incentives in a mission-
orientated organisation with administrative constraint is equal to 1(a)   2(a): Therefore, if
a  ao we have that P (a) = 0; while if a < ao; then the power of incentives is P (a) =
qN2 (a)   a[B(qN1 (a))   B(qN2 (a))]: Recall that qN1 (a) > qo1 > qo2 > qN2 (a) and a[B(qN1 (a))  
B(qN2 (a))]  qN2 (a): Clearly, then, the power of incentives under the full-information contract
is (weakly) lower than that under the No-Shut-Down contract. In fact, notice that if a < ao
then P (a) = (qN1 (a); q
N
2 (a); a;): That is, the power of incentives coincides with the size
of rents given to the high-productivity agent. Thus, if a 2 (0; q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a))); incentives are
not at, yet within this range, the power of incentives and mission-motivation are substitutes
(i.e. P 0 < 0): To see this, recall that if a 2 (0; q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a))); then qi = q^i(a), i = 1; 2;
(q1; q2; a;) = q2 a[B(q1) B(q2)] and q^01(a) > 0; q^02(a) < 0: It follows that the power of
incentives here is lower than in a prot-maximising agency (i.e. than P (0)): This is consistent
with, and complements, Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Francois (2000, 2003 and 2004). It
also complements arguments like the ones in Dixit (2002a) that are based on multi-tasking and
common-agency as to why public organisations tend to rely less than private organisations on
monetary incentives. Recall, however, that if a 2 [ q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a)) ; ao) then rents are zero, so, in
contrast to Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Francois (2000, 2003 and 2004), our model predicts
that for intermediate levels of output-motivation incentives are at, despite the fact that
the full-information outcome is not implementable. In general, in our model, high motivation
makes it costly for the low-cost agent to over-report costs in order to produce less and thereby
24
Page 26 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
increase prots. Thus, intrinsic-motivation reduces the scope for external incentives.
The policy implications of these observations are clear. Namely, introducing high-powered
incentives in the provision of public services and other collective goods, simply because such
incentives seem to work well in the prot-maximising sector, may not be the best of practices.
Another way to put this is to note that maxfqi0gi=1;2fs[B(q1)  1q1   (q1; q2; a;)] + (1 
s)[B(q2)  2q2] s.t. (q1; q2; a;)  0g; that is, the expected net surplus (on the part of the
principal) from the provision of public services is either negatively correlated or independent of
the power of incentives for su¢ ciently low motivation (i.e. a < ao). To see this note rst that
a straightforward application of the envelope theorem tells us that the expected net surplus
is increasing if a < ao: Second, recall from the above discussion that the power of incentives
is decreasing with output-motivation if a 2 (0; q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a))); while incentives are at if
a 2 [ q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a)) ; ao): This result is similar to the relationship between incentives and the
agents expected productivity emphasised in Besley and Ghatak (2005).
We leave this Section by commenting upon the choice of missions in the provision of
collective goods. Recall that the principals net surplus depends on the agents motivation, as
the latter reduces the information rents on the part of the agent that are necessary for the
agent to perform well (i.e. P 0(a)  0). This implies that the choice, for instance, of a schools
curriculum will a¤ect the net expected returns from education. In fact, in terms of our model, the
net surplus is increasing in the agents output-motivation if a < ao. This implies that, during
a reform in the provision of collective goods, care must be taken so that agents do not become
demotivated in the event of a change in the organisations mission; that is, so that, in terms
of our model, a does not decr ase. This is particularly important for nonprot organisations
that often accept donations which are conditional on the organisations mission. It is also
relevant for government-funded organisations, as, in this case, the government may attempt
to inuence the organisations mission to bring it closer to the preferences of the electorate.
These observations echo similar observations vis-a-vis an agencys expected productivity in
Besley and Ghatak (2005).43
43 In a related discussion, Prendercast (2007) discusses the problem of a principal who must hire and then
incentivise, by means of imperfect monitoring, a bureaucrat who is responsible for recommending an allocation
to a client. The recommendation is of better quality the more e¤ort the bureaucrat exerts in collecting the
necessary information. The client can instigate an investigation by complaining about the recommendation.
The bureaucrat also is an altruist: he cares for the clients valuation of the allocation. The main result, then,
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Note now that an agents net surplus from the provision of collective goods will also
depend on the organisations mission. In terms of our model, if a < ao; then, at optimum, the
high-productivity agents net surplus is aB(q1(a)) + P (a); while the low-productivity agents
net surplus is aB(q2(a)): Thus an agents surplus depends on her not-for-prot motive both
directly and indirectly, through production and information rents. Recall from our discussion
above that if a 2 (0; q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a))); then P (a) > 0 with P 0(a) < 0 and q02 (a) < 0. Also, if a
2 [ q^2(a)B(q^1(a)) B(q^2(a)) ; ao) then P (a) = 0 and q01 (a) is ambiguous. Thus, the agents net surplus
can be decreasing with output-motivation, regardless of her productivity. In fact, this will be
the case if (a) output is decreasing with intrinsic motivation and/or incentives are not at,
and (b) the corresponding negative welfare e¤ects dominate the direct positive welfare e¤ect
of mission-motivation.44 This potential conict of interest over the organisations mission (i.e.
a schools curriculum) between the principal (a schools board of governors) and the agent (a
schools teachers) raises additional problems in the choice of the mission. Namely, changing
the agencys goal may demotivate the agent (i.e. a may drop in terms of our model), and
thereby raise the importance of monetary incentives. In addition, changing an organisations
mission may meet the opposition of the agency; that is, output-motivation on the part of
agents may lead to conservatism. This is of particular importance for public bureaucracies,
where the political principal, who may have her/his own views about the agencys goal or
mission, is chosen by an electoral process. It may also explain why public bureaucracies are
often accused of resisting innovation. Finally, this potential conict of interest implies that
empowering parents to intervene in schoolsteaching methods and curriculums and enabling
patients to intervene in the provision of health services may meet the opposition of education
and health providers.45
is that in order to induce high e¤ort the hired bureaucrat should in many cases be biased either against or in
favour of the client, depending on the alignment between the preferences of the principal and the client.
44Note that if a  ao then the principals surplus is independent of a; while the agents welfare aB(qo) is
increasing with her intrinsic motivation. Thus, in this range, increasing intrinsic motivation does not create a
conict of interest.
45See Besley and Ghatak (2005) for a related discussion.
26
Page 28 of 35
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
7 Conclusions
We have investigated a non-standard principal-agent model which we believe can be used to
study government and other mission-orientated organisations. We have postulated that the
relationship is hindered by an administrative constraint which requires budget appropriations
to cover monetary production costs and that the agent is intrinsically motivated in that the
agent values balanced-budget increases in output. The agency under investigation is thought
of as the side with the monopoly of information about aspects of production.
In this paper we have assumed that the agent does not have an outside option. Neverthe-
less, our results are valid if the derived utility from this option is not too high. An interesting
exercise would be to investigate the robustness of our results to the introduction of a highly
valuable outside option for the agency.
Moreover, we have assumed that the only source of asymmetric information is the agents
productivity. In reality, however, the xed cost could also be the private information of the
bureau. In such an environment the principal will be faced with bidimensional asymmetric
information. This would also be the case if the extent of the non-prot motivation was as
well private knowledge of the agency. The investigation of the optimal design of the agency in
the presence of multidimensional asymmetric information is a very interesting and challenging
topic and is left for future research.46
In our model, the administrative constraint is present, and the agent values output over
and above any monetary income she receives in the process. As we have seen the results di¤er
signicantly from those for the agent who is either intrinsically-motivated or wealth-constrained
but not both. This leads us to conjecture that investigating further the case where the agent
is both wealth-constrained and mission-motivated is worthwhile both from a theoretical point
of view and for the deeper understanding of the operation of government and other nonprot
organisations.
For instance, one could investigate the case of many types. Many of the insights of our two
type model, though not all, extend to the many-type case. In particular, subject to a regularity
condition, which is similar though not the same as the one deployed in the standard model
to ensure that there is no bunching of types, only the local upward incentive-compatibility
46For some related issues involved in multidimensional mechanism design see, for instance, Armstrong (1996)
and Rochet and Chone (1998).
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constraints (that ensure that the i  type does not mimic the i+1  type with i+1 > i)
and the administrative constraints are relevant for the design of incentives. With no bunching,
then, it is still optimal to give zero rents to the least productive type. It is also still true that
the information rents of some types, which are necessary to prevent them from over-reporting
costs, are decreasing with his intrinsic motivation and production, while they are increasing
with the production of the immediately less productive type. Thus, external and internal
incentives are still substitutes. Moreover, the least productive type under-produces, while the
most productive type overproduces. Furthermore, for reasons similar to the ones in the two-
type model, the rents given to more productive types may be zero. However, intermediate
types may over- or under- produce. The reason is simple. To reduce the rents surrendered to
more productive types, their production should be distorted downwards, as usual. To reduce
their rents, on the other hand, their production should be distorted pwards, so the net e¤ect
is ambiguous.
One could also investigate the case of an informed principal, the case of repeated inter-
actions, the presence of career concerns, the case of team-production, the cases of common
agency and multi-tasking and the case of moral hazard for given productivity. These tasks are
left for future research.
8 Appendices
8.1 Appendix A
Ignoring q1  0; (7) the rst order conditions (for the derivation of the optimal revelation
mechanism) with respect to 2; 1; q1 and q2 are, respectively,
2 = 1 + 1  s (17)
1 = s  1 (18)
s[B0(q1)  1] =  1aB0(q1) (19)
(1  s)[B0(q2)  2] + v = 1[ + aB0(q2)]; (20)
where 1 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the low-cost agencys limited-liability constraint, 2
is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the high-cost agencys limited-liability constraint, 1 is the the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the low-cost agencys incentive-compatibility constraint, and v is the
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Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the high-cost agencys output non-negativity constraint. Moreover,
we have the following complementary-slackness conditions:
1  0; 1  0; 11 = 0; (21)
2  0; 2  0; 22 = 0; (22)
1  0; 1   2 + a[B(q1) B(q2)] q2  0; (23)
1[1   2 + a[B(q1) B(q2)] q2] = 0; (24)
v  0; q2  0; vq2 = 0: (25)
First, note that 2 > 0 and thus 2 = 0: Second note that if 1 = 0 then the above
conditions imply that 1 = s > 0; 1 = 0 and qi = q
o
i for any i = 1; 2; which violate
1   2 + a[B(q1) B(q2)] q2  0 given that a < ao:
Therefore, 1 > 0 and 1 2+a[B(q1) B(q2)] = q2: This condition and 2 = 0 imply
that 1  0 can be re-written as aB(q2) + q2  aB(q1): Note also that after eliminating
2 and 1 from the rst order conditions with respect to q1 and q2; we have that the latter
become, respectively,
s[(1 + a)B0(q1)  1] = 1aB0(q1) (26)
(1  s)[B0(q2)  2] + v = [s  1][ + aB0(q2)]; (27)
Clearly, these are the necessary conditions of problem (14) in the main text.
8.2 Appendix B
Consider the problem (14) in the main text:
max
q1;q2
s[(1 + a)B(q1)  (aB(q2) + q2 + 1q1)] + (1  s)[B(q2)  2q2] (28)
subject to
q2  0 and (29)
aB(q2) + q2  aB(q1): (30)
Denote the solution with qNi (a); i = 1; 2: If aB(q^2(a)) + q^2(a)  aB(q^1(a)) then the
unconstrained solution q^i(a); i = 1; 2; satises all the constraints, that can therefore be ignored.
The unconstrained maximum has strictly positive output levels. That is, qNi (a) = q^i(a) > 0;
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with the inequality following from q^1(a) > qo1(a) > 0 and aB(q^2(a)) + q^2(a)  aB(q^1(a)) >
0: Note also that q^1(a) > qo1(a) > q
o
2(a) > q^2(a): The latter follows from 1 s+s2 > 1 s sa:
Suppose now that the unconstrained maximum is not feasible: It follows then that the
second constraint is binding. To see this note rst that the rst order conditions with respect
to q1 and q2 are
s[(1 + a)B0(q1)  1] = 1aB0(q1) (31)
(1  s)[B0(q2)  2   s[aB
0(q2) + ]
1  s ] + 1[aB
0(q2) + ] + v = 0; (32)
where v and 1 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers of the above constraints, respectively. If
1 = 0 the above conditions imply that qi = q^i(a) for any i = 1; 2: Given aB(q^2(a)) +
q^2(a) < aB(q^1(a)) the second constraint is violated. Hence, 1 > 0: Eliminating 1 from the
above conditions, we then have after some trivial re-arrangement of terms that aB
0(q1)
aB0(q2)+ =
  s[B0(q1) 1](1 s)[B0(q2) 2]+v and 1 =
s[(1+a)B0(q1) 1]
aB0(q1) > 0: The latter implies that q
N
1 (a) < q^1(a): More-
over, the former condition implies, in conjuction with B0(0) > 2; that if q2 = 0; then q1 > qo1:
But 0 < aB(qo1); so the condition aB(q2)+q2  aB(q1) is violated when q2 = 0: Thus q2 > 0
and v = 0. The fact that 1 > 0; and hence aB(q2) + q2 = aB(q1); in conjuction with
q2 > 0; implies that q1 > 0: Thus, qNi (a) = qi(a): Notice now that due to a < a
o; qo1 > q
o
2 > 0
and the properties of B; we have that q1(a) > qo1(a) > q
o
2(a) > q2(a) > 0:
8.3 Appendix C
This appendix is available upon request.
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